The Absence of De-radicalisation Initiatives 5 Years After ‘One of New Zealand’s Darkest Days’
By Genevieve Kuan
I Introduction
Over five years have passed since 51 people were murdered and 40 suffered gunshot injuries during Friday prayers in the mass shootings at Masjid Al Noor and Linwood Islamic Centre in Ōtautahi Christchurch. The impact of the 15 March terrorist attacks, first and foremost on the victims, affected whānau, and the Muslim community, cannot be overstated. More widely, it was an abrupt and violent alert that terrorism, in this case, accompanied by a host of far-right extremism, white nationalism, and anti-immigrant ideologies, may be closer to home than previously thought. The prevailing question, therefore, was how New Zealand’s deficient laws and policies ought to change to strengthen national safety and security. This article will explore whether, and to what extent, New Zealand’s response is legitimately focussed on combating radicalisation.
II New Zealand’s Current Prevention Strategy
The Department of Corrections provides a working definition of de-radicalisation, this being “the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalisation is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity.” De-radicalisation is distinguishable from disengagement as it involves a cognitive change, not merely a change in observable behaviour. In New Zealand, de-radicalisation is very limited and barely tested, especially in comparison to the United Kingdom, known to be a leader of the ‘soft-power’ security measures which aim to prevent susceptible individuals from being radicalised and to de-radicalise risky individuals.
A Recommendation 4
Although de-radicalisation initiatives are limited in New Zealand, the initiatives and policies implemented in response to 15 March show a growing focus on preventing radicalisation. On 2 August 2024, the Government announced that its response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry (“RCOI”) into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain had concluded. Of the 44 recommendations the RCOI released in December 2020, the Government declined 8, integrated 14 into relevant agencies, and implemented 22, one of which was recommendation 4.
This recommendation was for the Government to “develop and implement a public facing strategy that addresses extremism and preventing, detecting, and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism.” None of the RCOI’s recommendations specifically mentioned de-radicalisation programs.
B Absence of De-radicalisation Initiatives in New Zealand’s Counter-terrorism Strategy
New Zealand’s primary prevention instrument, which the Government says meets the RCOI’s fourth recommendation, is located in the existing Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy (“CT Strategy”). The CT Strategy’s stated priority is to combat radicalisation in all forms. However, it focuses almost exclusively on preventing radicalisation in its early stages, for example, providing support for “at-risk groups to resist radicalisation” and imposing an obligation on private sector organisations to ensure that their spaces are not being used to promote or share violent extremist or terrorist material. Its focus is also shown by the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) Strategic Fund, which supports organisations to deliver initiatives that build resilience to radicalisation.
The Department of Corrections conducted some research into PCVE in 2017 and there is some evidence that Corrections had dealt with a small number of individuals through the PCVE program with the aim of de-radicalisation in 2019. With these limited exceptions, New Zealand’s CT Strategy seems to lack the substantial initiatives for de-radicalisation that other jurisdictions have. For instance, the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy provides for the Healthy Identity Intervention initiative, which seeks to address the beliefs that enable someone to offend and aims to minimise their subscription to that ideology.
C He Aranga Ake
Outside of the RCOI into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain and New Zealand’s CT Strategy, which both focus on the prevention of radicalisation to the exclusion of de-radicalising already risky or recruited individuals, New Zealand “revamped” its multi-agency de-radicalisation program called He Aranga Ake in December 2022.
He Aranga Ake provides targeted and individualised interventions and support to “disengage” individuals who are at risk of radicalisation. It aims to do so by building their resilience, self-confidence, and increasing protective factors against radicalisation. It is, therefore, focussed on preventing someone from being radicalised in the first instance, rather than reducing the risk posed by an already ‘radicalised’ offender.
III The Merits and Pitfalls of De-radicalisation
New Zealand’s counter-terrorism response focuses on preventing an individual from being radicalised or forming extremist views in the first instance. Considering the initiatives known to the public, it appears that we currently lack robust programs to reduce an individual’s existing commitment to violent extremism. The debate over the efficacy and human rights compliance of de-radicalisation programs is sprawling.
The current research suggests that New Zealand may have a lot to gain from supplementing its prevention approach with an approach that focuses on de-radicalisation. However, if these initiatives are implemented, the Government should pay close attention to how they can be made effective while also addressing human rights concerns.
A Calls for De-radicalisation Programs
Proponents of de-radicalisation emphasise the need to rehabilitate offenders in a similar manner to offenders perpetrating non-terrorist related crimes. Following 15 March 2019, a security specialist submitted to the RCOI that there were no de-radicalisation or deterrence-based programs for individuals affiliated with extremist or radical ideologies, nor programs to ensure they were reintegrated into society.
According to that submission, it was the absence of these measures that enabled the process of radicalisation to continue undisrupted, potentially leading to dangerous outcomes. An academic wrote a similar submission that former extremists have helped people leave extremist groups by engaging with them through a de-radicalisation program. They believed that efforts to reduce one’s commitment to radical ideas should be prioritised over punitive and security measures that could further alienate the individual.
In their UK-based research, Walker and Cawley aptly summarise the justifications for de-radicalisation programs. While the cause of violent extremism is near-impossible to pin down, it is undisputed that terrorism often derives from factors such as relative socio-economic deprivation, cultural influences, social exclusion, and in diaspora communities. If one accepts that, the next contention is to say that terrorist ideology is not always deeply ingrained, but one’s adherence to it is both a product of their circumstances and able to be shifted by persuasion. Therefore, like rehabilitating non-terrorist offenders, proponents of de-radicalisation programs see de-indoctrination as one of the desired responses to terrorism, one which chips away at its root cause.
B The Case Against De-radicalisation
There are, however, many sources of controversy and pushback to de-radicalisation, not least being the absence of systematic research that proves the efficacy of de-radicalisation programs. Certainly, doubts may be raised over whether the perpetrator of the 15 March terrorist attacks could be dissuaded from his ideologies and extremist convictions.
In part, this is because nuanced drivers of radicalisation and associated violence are extremely varied between individuals, and even if we understand the drivers of radical thought, there only exists a correlation between radicalism and violence. That doubt is brought home, at least anecdotally, by the fact that the two perpetrators of the 2017 London Bridge attack were known to the Police, had been referred to the UK’s Prevent program, and were subject to de-radicalisation interventions.
Perhaps the instinct is to strengthen the enforceability and intensity of these programs, but that is predicated upon the assumption that this will improve the outcomes, and it may bring these programs into grey areas of human rights compliance. As the Human Rights Commission found, PCVE strategies engage one's right to non-discrimination, expression, movement, thought, conscience, religion, association, and assembly.
Not only did the Commission recommend that the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet prioritise de-radicalising those who are already radicalised, but it recommended that an action plan be developed which emphasises the programs’ adherence to human rights principles.
IV Conclusion
The atrocities of 15 March 2019 gave New Zealand a reason to legislate and tighten its response to terrorism in all aspects, ranging from firearms licencing and social media censorship to terrorist financing. Amidst the CT Strategy’s heavy emphasis on preventing individuals from being drawn into radical and extremist ideologies, the New Zealand public is not aware of any instrument that aims to draw radicalised and potentially dangerous individuals out of the ideologies that commonly fuel terrorist attacks.
Perhaps, this is the CT Strategy’s blind spot. However, while de-radicalisation and, more broadly, prevention programs are suitable and worthy responses, especially in comparison to curing a situation after-the-fact, there are a host of reasons to be cautious of them. If New Zealand is to commit to de-radicalisation it must take the lessons learnt from overseas programs and heed the human rights implications that arise during implementation.
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